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ABSTRACT 
 
The commentaries raise a host of challenging issues and reflect a broad range of 
views. Some commentators doubt that there is any convincing evidence for 
adaptive misbelief, and remain (in our view, unduly) wedded to our “default 
presumption” that misbelief is maladaptive. Others think that the evidence for 
adaptive misbelief is so obvious, and so widespread, that the label “default 
presumption” is disingenuous. We try to chart a careful course between these 
opposing perspectives. 
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R1. Introduction 
We are very gratified by the thoughtful and temperate responses to our Target 
Article. Our aims were ambitious, and the commentaries reflect the broad scope 
of the topic we tackled. In this response we will try to attend to the most 
important themes that have emerged. We cannot hope to address each and every 
substantive point our commentators have raised, but we will try not to shy away 
from the thorny issues. 
 
We began with a “default presumption” or “prevailing assumption” - veridical 
beliefs beget reproductive fitness. Simply put, true beliefs are adaptive, and 
misbeliefs maladaptive. Our aim was to investigate an alternative possibility, the 
possibility of adaptive misbelief. Liddle and Shackelford note that the 
epigraphs that introduce certain sections of our manuscript showcase this 
alternate perspective; the implication, they suggest, is that the possibility we 
explore is already well established, in which case our “prevailing assumption” is a 
straw man. A similar point is made by Cokely and Feltz, who note that the 
argument for adaptive misbelief is not new. We agree with Cokely and Feltz - the 
argument is not a new one. Had it been our intention to suggest otherwise, we 
would have been rather unwise to incorporate the aforementioned quotations. 
The fact that the argument is not new, however, does not mean that it is accepted. 
One has only to glance through the commentaries to see that the issue is far from 
settled. We put forward a somewhat tentative claim about adaptive misbelief - 
only positive illusions, we argued, fit the bill. Interestingly, while some of our 
commentators (e.g. Dunning; Dweck; Flanagan; Frankish; Konečni; 
Kruger, Chan & Roese; Marcus; Millikan; Wilks) appear to think that we 
went too far here, a slew of others seem to think that we didn’t go far enough 
(e.g. Ackerman, Shapiro & Maner; Cokely & Feltz; Haselton & Buss; 
Johnson; Mishara & Corlett; Randolph-Seng; Schloss & Murray; 
Talmont-Kaminski; Zawidzki). You can’t please everyone. As we see it, one 
of the main contributions of our article is to reveal these striking differences of 
opinion and perspective. Our response is ordered roughly as follows: after 
clarifying some points about evolution that met with confusion or disagreement, 
we respond first to those who think our claim errs on the generous side, and then 
turn to those who view our claim as overly cautious and who seek, one way or 
another, to extend our analysis. 
 
R2. Oversimplify and self-monitor 
As several commentators (e.g. Boyer; Sutton) point out, cognitive systems are 
necessarily compromises that have to honor competing demands in one way or 
another. Since time is of the essence, the speed-accuracy tradeoff is critical; cost 
also matters so “fast and frugal” systems or methods (Gigerenzer & Goldstein 
1996; Gigerenzer et al. 1999) are often the order of the day.  But these can 
generate errors in abundance, so if the animal can afford it, it is good to have a 
meta-system of one kind or another in place monitoring the results, discarding 
bad outputs when they arise and shifting methods if possible.  Good advice, then, 
in both animal design and artifact design, is oversimplify and self-monitor 
(Dennett, 1984a). 
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The BBS format enables this strategy, and we followed it in our Target Article. 
Our deliberately oversimplified definition of belief set the table for a variety of 
useful commentaries showing just how complicated these issues truly are. We had 
a lot of ground to survey, so we decided, pragmatically, to paint with broad 
strokes, and to come back later (in this response to commentary) with the called-
for corrections. As several commentators (e.g. Cokely & Feltz; Gjersoe & 
Hood; Liddle & Shackelford; Wereha & Racine) point out, our hyper-
general definition of belief, as “a functional state of an organism that implements 
or embodies that organism’s endorsement of a particular state of affairs as 
actual,” blurs the oft-proposed boundaries between a range of arguably distinct 
types of cognitive states. (It is also worth remembering that in the working 
vocabularies of many people, the everyday term “belief” is restricted to matters of 
great moment only - religious belief, political creed and other topics of capital-b 
Belief – and would not be used to discuss one’s current perceptual state or 
whether there was beer in the fridge.) We did discuss, and approve of, Gendler’s 
(2008) alief/belief distinction, and Ainslie puts it to good use, also reminding us 
(in personal correspondence) of Gendler’s useful mnemonic characterization, 
which we should have quoted in the Target Article:  
 
alief is associative, automatic, and arational. As a class, aliefs are states that we share 
with nonhuman animals; they are developmentally and conceptually antecedent to other 
cognitive attitudes that the creature may go on to develop. And they are typically also 
affect-laden and action generating. (Gendler, 2008, p. 641; emphasis in original) 
 
But we did not even mention, as Frankish points out, the acceptance/belief 
distinction, which, he argues, may turn out to play a key role: a pragmatic 
acceptance is not, strictly speaking, a misbelief at all, and our prime candidates 
for adaptive misbeliefs, positive illusions, may be voluntarily adopted policies, not 
involuntarily imposed biases – in us, if not in other animals incapable of such 
“metacognitive” evaluations.  This leads Frankish to a sketch of an experimental 
paradigm well worth pursuing. Flanagan and Konečni raise similar objections. 
Flanagan comments on the strategic role of statements of belief in competitive 
contexts, but notes that there is nothing epistemically disreputable about 
believing that one can win: “‘can’ does not entail ‘will.’” Further on, however, he 
makes a telling slip: “Both players, if they are any good, go into the match 
believing that they can win, indeed that they will win” (our emphasis). Flanagan 
is right that there is no mistake in believing that one can win, or in hoping that 
one will win. But where both players believe that they will win, we have misbelief 
(although not necessarily unreasonable misbelief; each may have compelling 
reasons for expecting to win). Insofar as such misbelief boosts confidence and 
enables honest signaling of such confidence, it may be adaptive. Like Frankish 
and Flanagan, Konečni suggests that positive illusions may represent doxastically 
uncommitted action policies. Haselton and Buss and Johnson, however, take 
roughly the opposite view, arguing that genuine (mis)beliefs may generate 
adaptive behavior more effectively than cautious action policies. We return to 
their commentaries below. 
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It is tempting to re-baptize acceptance as c-lief, since it stands to belief roughly as 
belief stands to alief, a more sophisticated and expensive state, reserved now for 
just one species, us. (cf.  Dennett’s 1978 belief/opinion distinction, which is 
explicitly modeled on betting on the truth of a sentence which one believes [not 
alieves] to be true.)  But this won’t help resolve all the confusions, since, as 
Krebs and Denton observe, collaborative positive illusions (e.g., “I’m OK, 
you’re OK”) may begin as pragmatic policies or acceptances – we are, in Haidt’s 
(2001) nice observation, intuitive lawyers, not intuitive [truth-seeking] scientists 
– but among the effects in us are unarticulated cognitive tendencies that may be 
best seen as akin to aliefs – except for not being antecedent to all other cognitive 
attitudes. 
 
R3. Is our evolutionary thinking naïve? 
Several commentators challenge our frankly adaptationist reasoning as naïve, 
and our “reverse engineering” perspective on misbelief is seen as blinkered or 
distorting.  The points they raise are instructive, but serve rather to expose the 
weaknesses of various standard objections to adaptationism. Wilks, for instance, 
sees ghosts of Lamarck and Sheldrake’s morphic resonances (!) in our project, 
and suggests that even Chomsky’s curious views on evolution have more 
plausibility than ours.  He “cannot see what all this has to do with evolution, 
understood as natural selection of traits inherited through the genome,” and 
indeed, from that pinched perspective, it is not surprising that he would miss the 
point.  Natural selection is not just about “traits inherited through the genome.”  
Perhaps he was misled by the fact that we carefully distinguished – as some do 
not – between genetic fitness and human happiness, but we also went to some 
lengths to note the role of gene-culture coevolution, and nowhere did we restrict 
natural selection to genetic evolution (see below, sections R5 & R7). Wilks 
expresses doubts about how “brain modifications might conceivably affect the 
gametes,” ignoring the Baldwin Effect (Deacon, 1997; Dennett, 1991, 1995, 
2003b), a particularly clear path by which surprisingly specific talents can 
migrate from brain modifications into the genome. (Fear of Lamarckian heresy 
has prevented many from taking the Baldwin Effect seriously; it is not heretical 
biology.) His comparison with Fodor’s notorious example of an innate concept of 
telephone is simply a straw man. There are plenty of well-proven cases in which 
ecologically significant contents of considerable specificity are genetically 
transmitted. The fear of snakes exhibited by laboratory-raised monkeys and small 
children that have never seen a snake (Mineka, Davidson, Cook & Keir, 1984; 
LoBue and DeLoache, 2008), for instance, or the species-specific nest-building 
dispositions of birds that have never seen such a nest being built should temper 
his incredulity. 
 
Especially in the case of behavior regulators, there is typically an interplay, a 
coordination, between genetically transmitted features and culturally (or 
“socially”) transmitted elements. Marcus is right that it does not follow that if 
something could be learned, it must be learned; it might well be innate, but also 
vice versa, as Avital and Jablonka (2000) show: many long-presumed innate 
animal “instincts” turn out to be learned behaviors, copied in one way or another 
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from parents’ behavior, not part of their genetic legacy, as a host of cross-
fostering studies demonstrate. The genes fix the disposition to attend to what the 
parents do, but the rest is up to environmental transmission. What this fact 
brings to our attention is that Mother Nature is not a gene-centrist! Where 
genetic evolution leaves off and developmental and indeed “empiricist” (Marcus) 
psychological learning takes over is an entirely open option, with large differences 
between fairly closely related species.  (Consider the wide variation in the extent 
to which species-typical bird song is innate.)  Marcus’ example of  “learning to 
walk” is useful, since, as he says, there is an innate stepping reflex in humans that 
exists at birth.  On top of this reflex comes something we can still call learning to 
walk.  His point is not that walking is innate in humans – it isn’t, when compared 
with, say, the walking (indeed, running) skills found in a newborn antelope.  
Where innate instinct leaves off and learning begins is not a line that can be, or 
need be, sharply drawn. It goes without saying, we thought, that belief-generating 
mechanisms depend critically on environmental input, but we should have said it 
anyway, as several commentators (e.g. Dunning; Dweck) chide us for 
underestimating the importance of environmental variation. So we agree with 
Dweck, Liddle and Shackelford and Wilks that individual, isolated beliefs are 
unlikely to be the target of genetic selection, but that does not imply that quite 
specific biases could not be incorporated into our genetically transmitted 
equipment. We may in effect be primed to imprint on whatever in the 
environment fills a certain fairly specific doxastic role, much as newly hatched 
ducklings imprint on the first large moving thing they see and follow it. 
 
Similarly, as a number of commentators reveal, the line between by-product and 
adaptation is not sharp at all.  Every adaptation, after all, must emerge from 
something that varies “randomly” (under no selection) or from some prior 
arrangement that persists for other reasons, and what had heretofore been a by-
product is brought into focus and enhanced and exploited by selective pressure. 
Showing that something is (likely) a by-product does not rule out the possibility 
that there is (already, as it were) opportunistic selective pressure on it. The bright 
colors of autumn foliage of deciduous trees in New England are probably just a 
by-product of the chemistry of chlorophyll loss after leaf death (though this has 
recently been challenged by evidence that it signals either inhospitality or vigor to 
aphids looking for a winter home; see Yamazaki, 2008), but whether or not 
aphids are attracted to, or repelled by, bright autumn colors, assuredly there is 
now selective advantage to having brilliant autumn color in New England; the 
economies of Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine benefit significantly from the 
autumn “leaf-peepers” (foliage enthusiasts) that invade, and hence there is a 
pronounced bias against cutting down handsome trees and for planting, or 
encouraging the growth of, the most colorful variants. 
 
Adaptationists know – or should know, since the classic work of George Williams 
(1966) – that the evidential demands for establishing an adaptation are greater 
than the demands for discovering a mere by-product. As Millikan says, “If 
certain kinds of errors are common and also systematically useful, it does not 
follow that they are common because they are useful.” It does not follow, but 
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fortunately there are ways of testing to see if and when such adaptationist 
hypotheses are true. Sometimes, however, the tests are too impractical to carry 
out (they might require a few thousand years of observation of evolution, for 
instance), and often the adaptation is so obvious, once discovered, that nobody 
bothers challenging the claim.  It is interesting that the charge of “Just So Story” 
leveled at adaptationists is almost entirely reserved for hypotheses dealing with 
features of human evolution.  A brief canvassing of textbooks of biology will find 
literally thousands of examples of confidently asserted adaptationist claims that 
have never been challenged and never been thoroughly tested – claims about the 
functions of enzymes, the functions of organs, the functions of behaviors (of 
protists, animals, plants…).  People get touchy when their own organs and 
behaviors are analyzed from an adaptationist perspective, but unless they are 
prepared to dismiss the mountains of insight to be found in the rest of biology, 
they should stop treating “Just So Story” as a handy-dandy wild-card refutation-
device. It is no such thing. 
 
Critics of adaptationism are right, however, that there is a perilous amount of free 
scope in the range of permissible hypotheses.  For instance, why does nature so 
often counteract one bit of flawed design with another, compensatory one, 
instead of just “fixing” the first? Maybe there is a constraint – so far unknown – 
that renders the latter course impossible or more expensive (see discussion of 
Haselton & Buss below, and see McKay & Efferson, under review, for a 
discussion of constraints in the context of error management theory).  Such 
chains of reasoning are not just flights of fancy, since there are differential 
consequences that can usually be tested for, but until such tests are conducted, we 
are left with merely plausible conjectures.  This open-endedness haunts the 
discussions below - see, e.g., our discussion of Johnson – since the question to 
which commentators continually return is whether it is cheaper or easier for the 
mind to deceive itself with misinformation than to provide accurate information 
and adjust its prudential policies to fit the risk. Until this can be assessed by 
evaluating known cognitive mechanisms and their evolutionary costs, this has to 
remain an unsettled question. 
 
Wereha and Racine chant the standard evo-devo mantra, claiming that “by 
reverse engineering the beliefs of adult humans” we forgo a developmental 
analysis, which is true enough, but does it matter in this case?  They are right, of 
course, that environmental interactions, especially those that engage language, 
are crucial, and for that reason cultural-genetic interactions are necessary.  What 
we disagree with is their claim that evo-devo considerations obviate or even blunt 
the effectiveness of reverse engineering approaches.  One simply has to do one’s 
reverse-engineering with more attention to the myriad possibilities raised by 
developmental demands. One way of putting their main claim is this: because 
development, from embryo on, is a process that has to protect the robustness of 
the organism at every stage, later (e.g., “adult”) features could just as easily be 
leftovers, fossil traces, of features that paid for themselves in infancy as features 
that pay for themselves in adulthood.  That is, indeed, a distinct possibility that 
needs to be considered. And Gjersoe and Hood provide a possible example: the 
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entrenchment phase in hypothesis formation in childhood development. This 
oversimplification strategy has a huge payoff: oversimplify and (eventually) self-
monitor, but in those who are not particularly reflective, a tendency to cling 
uncritically to one’s first hypothesis might be a residue of a particularly adaptive 
bias in childhood that has outlived its usefulness.   
 
R4. Adaptive oversimplifications 
Oversimplifications that make cognitive life easier are also proposed by 
Zawidzki, who notes that Dennett himself (1991) has argued that the concept of 
a self is a benign “user illusion” and also that much of the specificity of self-
interpretation may be an artifact of societal demand, adaptive in the context of 
complex sociality. We indeed overlooked the role of such oversimplifications as 
instances of adaptive misbelief, probably because, like the concept of a center of 
gravity, they can quite readily be recast as something like strategic metaphors 
rather than falsehoods (consider the widespread understanding that there is 
nothing pejorative in the everyday understanding of the “user illusion” that 
makes laptops so user-friendly).  We agree that they make an illuminating further 
category to explore (see also the discussion of free will below). 
 
In this light, Bertamini and Casati could be seen as suggesting that naïve 
physics is also an instance of oversimplify and self-monitor, on a hugely different 
time scale.  We are only in recent centuries beginning to discover the falsehoods 
latent in our everyday conception of the world, a conception that is, as they say, 
“prima facie veridical” in that it does not “interfere with our interactions with the 
world.” This pragmatic effectiveness, of course, is the evolutionary rationale for 
the default assumption that true beliefs are adaptive and misbeliefs are not. As 
Millikan observes, “it is getting straight about what is in front of our noses that 
is the first order of importance for us.”  (Boyer says that what matters for 
adaptive design is “that the circumstances in question be such that decision-
making does not lead to excessive vulnerability.”) Not bumping into dangerous 
things, and finding food, shelter and mates requires a certain amount of effective 
information-gathering – and not misinformation-gathering. Wilson and Lynn 
view the fact that our senses give us only a narrow window on the physical 
variation in the available environmental stimuli as “deception”, but that is 
unwarranted; sensory systems that provide a truncated or edited message that 
informs may not give the whole truth, while giving, normally, nothing but the 
truth. The obvious norm for information-gathering is not to be deflected by the 
motivational system, since wishful thinking is typically unrealistic and sometimes 
catastrophically so (Ainslie). At the same time, as various commentators note, 
there can be overriding reasons for editing the information-gathering to 
accomplish various palliative ends.  If the truth hurts too much, it will disable, not 
enable, the intentional agent. 
 
R5. Illusions and collusions 
Although a number of commentators (Ackerman et al.; Brown; Gjersoe & 
Hood; Krebs & Denton) endorse our claim that positive illusions represent 
sound candidates for adaptive misbelief, others are skeptical. First, there are 
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methodological and statistical concerns. For example, although Cokely and 
Feltz argue that adaptive misbeliefs are in general much more widespread than 
we allowed, they point out that better-than-average effects can represent 
statistical artifacts. The fact that driving ability has a negatively skewed 
distribution means that most drivers simply are better-than-average; the mean is 
clearly an inappropriate measure of central tendency in this case. We do not 
dispute this, but we note that better-than-average effects are also documented for 
normally distributed traits, and (as Kruger et al. note) the effects replicate 
when other, similar methodological points are taken into consideration. 
 
A different sort of concern has to do with the contexts in which positive illusions 
are observed. Some commentators (Dweck, Flanagan, Konečni and Kruger 
et al.) appear to suggest that if such illusions are a product of genetic evolution, 
they should not be confined to a particular culture or to a particular historical 
epoch. Moreover, as Dunning observes, they should be particularly evident in 
tasks with adaptive significance. The latter analysis across task contexts has not 
been done, as Dunning notes, but there are data about the cross-cultural 
replicability of positive illusions. Unfortunately, however, there does not appear 
to be consensus on this issue: Brown states that “positively-biased self-
perceptions are a pervasive, cross-cultural phenomenon”, but Dweck, Flanagan 
and Kruger et al. express doubts about the cultural universality of positive 
illusions, noting that they are more reliably documented in Western societies. In 
any case, we note here that cultural variability is by no means a decisive datum 
against the evolutionary claim: if cultural evolution plays a coevolutionary role, 
there may be, in effect, cultural subspecies of evolved misbelief. 
 
Konečni claims that positive illusions are a feature of a particular historical 
period: “the recently terminated era of easy credit.” We enjoyed his commentary, 
and await empirical substantiation of this claim. We are confused, however, by 
his methodological critique of studies that purport to demonstrate positive 
illusions regarding participants’ children. On the one hand Konečni complains 
that such “studies have presumably not polled the opinions of the parents 
(including potential ones) who terminated pregnancies, or committed infanticide, 
physical and sexual abuse”. His implication at this point seems to be that 
offspring-directed positive illusions are an artifact of biased sampling. He goes 
on, however, to suggest that had such parents been polled, they would have 
demonstrated positive illusions regarding their children; this, he suggests, would 
undermine the suggestion that biased offspring appraisals facilitate parental care. 
We think Konečni is trying to have his cake and eat it too. Leaving aside 
pregnancy terminations (which were presumably uncommon in ancestral 
environments), we agree that demonstrations of offspring-directed positive 
illusions in abusive parents would undermine the evolutionary argument, but we 
doubt that such parents would harbor these illusions. This doesn’t mean, 
however, that the finding of widespread offspring-directed positive illusions is a 
statistical artifact – that depends on whether parental care is normally 
distributed (abusive parents may represent a “bump” at the lower end of the 
distribution), and on how much of the distribution was sampled by the relevant 
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studies. But if it is an artifact, it’s nevertheless a telling one, because it implicates 
a positive correlation between offspring-directed positive illusions and parental 
care, consistent with our evolutionary suggestion. 
 
More serious concerns are raised by Kruger et al. in their measured and 
informative commentary. Kruger et al. question whether positive illusions are the 
norm for healthy individuals, and they point out the many instances of systematic 
negative (self) illusions (Ackerman et al. also speak of negative illusions, but 
they refer to illusions that are negative with respect to others). We appreciate this 
point, but we note that the existence of negative self illusions is not in itself 
problematic for claims about the adaptive significance of positive self illusions – 
although it may, as Bertamini and Casati recognize, demonstrate that the 
relevant mechanisms are domain-specific rather than domain-general. As 
Haselton and colleagues have noted, a tendency toward false positives may be 
adaptive in certain adaptive contexts (as in the male sexual overperception bias 
that Haselton & Buss describe; see below for further discussion), whereas a 
tendency toward false negatives may be adaptive in others (as in the female 
commitment underperception bias that Haselton & Buss report elsewhere; see 
Haselton & Buss, 2000; see also Ackerman et al’s comments about the benefits of 
being “hard to get”). Different domains will call for biases in different directions. 
It is worth citing Hartung’s (1988) speculations about the adaptive value of 
negative self illusions in certain circumstances, what he calls “deceiving down”. It 
remains to be demonstrated, of course, that the negative illusions that Kruger et 
al. mention are domain-specific adaptations. 
 
Dunning also emphasizes the role of environmental context (as does Dweck), 
noting that misbeliefs often arise because the environment fails to furnish the 
information needed to form accurate judgments. Illusions, on this view, reflect 
forgivable design limitations rather than design features. Pessimistic predictions 
about the trustworthiness of others may persist not because they are fitness-
enhancing, as Ackerman et al. suggest, but because they are liable to 
confirmation but not to refutation. Marcus makes a similar point, noting that 
illusions may reflect the operation of a general confirmation-bias mechanism 
rather than dedicated domain-specific machinery. We note that even if a general 
confirmation-bias mechanism generates illusions as a well-entrenched subclass of 
outputs, the serendipitous benefits that those outputs provide might “protect” the 
confirmation bias mechanism (which does, after all, output a lot of mistaken 
cognition) from counter-selection, helping to “pay for” its persistence. If 
underestimations of others’ trustworthiness are less costly than overestimations 
(Ackerman et al.), then a mechanism that generates underestimations (initially) 
as a by-product may be a candidate for exaptation. 
 
Wilson and Lynn also mention the confirmation bias, linking it to the motive 
force of strong or “hot” affect. Marcus suggests that positive illusions are 
potentially underpinned by motivated reasoning, but we see this possibility as a 
potential generalization of – rather than necessarily an alternative to – the 
evolutionary claim we defended. As Ainslie discusses, in an extraordinarily rich 
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and compressed commentary, motivational and affective forces represent the 
proximal mechanisms by which natural selection tethers belief to survival. Our 
abilities to appraise evidence dispassionately may be selectively sabotaged 
(motivationally biased) in adaptive domains, yielding positive illusions. 
Motivated reasoning might not be adapted, however - it might be largely a by-
product of the selection for increasing intelligence that Ainslie describes, a 
process which enabled our ancestors to discover the intervening carrots and 
sticks of reward, and to begin devising ways of getting the carrots without going 
to the trouble of checking on the world. Human imagination was born, with all its 
costs and benefits. The result has been “the unhitching of reward from 
adaptiveness” and in the ensuing holiday of imagination, we have had to create 
methods of epistemic self-control to protect ourselves from our own freedom. 
Exploring the further wrinkles Ainslie draws to our attention will have to wait for 
another occasion. 
 
Wilson and Lynn point out that inflated self-esteem can come at a cost. We 
acknowledge that the connections between self-esteem and adaptive behaviours 
are complex, but we didn’t suggest that unrestrained self-esteem would be 
adaptive, and we cited Baumeister (1989) on the “optimal margin of illusion”. In 
fact, because self-esteem is such a heterogeneous concept we avoided using the 
term at all in our Target Article. The large survey that Wilson and Lynn cite 
points out that the category “self-esteem” encompasses a range of subtypes. For 
example, Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne and Correll (2003) 
characterized the defensive subtype as involving a discrepancy between high 
explicit (conscious) and low implicit (unconscious) self-esteem. These authors 
found that individuals with this discrepancy were significantly more narcissistic 
than individuals high in both explicit and implicit self-esteem. Discrepancies 
between implicit and explicit self-esteem have also been implicated in the 
formation of persecutory delusions (Bentall & Kaney, 1996; Kinderman & Bentall, 
1996, 1997; McKay, Langdon, & Coltheart, 2007; Moritz, Werner, & von Collani, 
2006). To the extent that illusory positive self-views are adaptive, therefore, we 
would predict them to be held at both conscious and unconscious levels. 
 
The above-discussed commentaries provide valuable correctives to our 
enthusiasm for positive illusions and the evolutionary implications thereof. We 
acknowledge that more research is needed to clarify whether illusional beliefs are 
reliably observed in specific adaptive contexts, and whether they trend in the 
expected directions. We also note, however, that a number of commentaries 
complement and extend our analysis of positive illusions. We have already 
mentioned Gjersoe and Hood’s suggestion that the developmental phase of 
theoretical entrenchment involves an adaptive positive illusion – “overconfidence 
in the generalisability of one’s theory”. Brown and Krebs and Denton detail 
the important role that people play in validating and perpetuating the illusions of 
others (Wilson & Lynn make this point about false beliefs more generally). In 
our Target Article we noted how the positive illusions of parents with respect to 
their co-parents and their children could strengthen familial bonds and facilitate 
parental care. Brown, however, notes that infants also benefit by internalizing the 
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positive illusions of their parents with respect to themselves. Krebs and Denton 
point out that individuals may manipulate others into validating their own 
positive self illusions, but they also appreciate (as does Brown) that this process 
can be collaborative and mutually beneficial. 
 
Boyer and Sutton describe how our own memory systems can be co-
conspirators in the maintenance of adaptive illusions. Both commentators note 
that selection does not indulge abstract epistemic concerns – memories need be 
accurate, therefore, only insofar as they are fitness-enhancing. Memories that are 
accurate for accuracy’s sake are a biological luxury, so adaptive considerations 
may frequently trump epistemic considerations. The result is that many of our 
memories, as beliefs about past occurrences, may be examples of adaptive 
misbelief. 
 
R6. Delusions and doxastic shear pins 
To provide a framework for our discussion, we developed a tentative taxonomy of 
misbelief. We began by distinguishing two general types: misbeliefs arising in the 
course of normal doxastic functioning and misbeliefs resulting from some kind of 
break in normal functioning. Liddle and Shackelford draw our attention to a 
similar analysis by Wakefield (1992). Wakefield’s (1992; see also 1999a,b) 
concern is to provide a rigorous theoretical grounding for the concept of (mental) 
disorder. His analysis incorporates both a value component (disorders are 
harmful, where “harm” is judged by the standards of the relevant culture) and an 
evolutionary component (disorders reflect the failures of internal mechanisms to 
carry out their naturally selected functions). We endorse Wakefield’s analysis – 
and regret not previously being aware of it - but note that his project is wider and 
more general than ours, distinguishing function from dysfunction in naturally 
selected mechanisms insofar as this distinction can guide decisions about 
candidates for disorder, while we are interested in belief specifically. 
 
As “disorders of belief”, delusions represent the key area of overlap between 
Wakefield’s analysis and ours. Our emphasis was on delusions as the output of 
belief-formation mechanisms that have ceased to perform their normal (naturally 
selected) functions - Wakefield’s evolutionary criterion. His value criterion, 
however, is clearly also important: delusions are harmful insofar as they occasion 
distress and insofar as they jeopardize the social and occupational functioning of 
individuals who hold them (this is the “clinical significance” criterion in the DSM-
IV-TR; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). In our Target Article we were 
wary of considering delusions as adaptive, and indeed we labeled them instances 
of “doxastic dysfunction” (although we didn’t clearly discriminate between 
biological and social conceptions of dysfunction). We did, however, speculate 
about a class of misbeliefs enabled by the action of system components designed 
to break: doxastic shear pins. Several of our commentators (Langdon; Liddle & 
Shackelford; Millikan; Mishara & Corlett) pick up on this concept. 
 
Langdon notes that if doxastic shear pins exist, their shearing should involve 
some kind of neurocognitive “short-circuit” rather than a stable 
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neuropsychological impairment. We agree with this point. She also distinguishes 
neuropsychological (deficit) and motivational answers to the question of why 
deluded individuals cling to their delusions. Mishara and Corlett consider this 
distinction an “overly strict conceptual schism”, and it is true that motivational 
and deficit hypotheses need not be mutually exclusive (Langdon is well aware of 
this). Although we found it useful to distinguish between misbeliefs that 
represent functionless departures from normal operation (“culpable design 
limitations”) and those that incorporate some functional component, we did 
acknowledge the porous nature of such conceptual boundaries. Nevertheless, we 
remain open to the possibility of misbeliefs with purely “deficit” aetiologies. 
Mishara and Corlett, however, favor the doxastic shear pin perspective: delusions 
accommodate aberrant prediction error signaling, disabling flexible conscious 
processing and enabling the preservation of habitual responses in the context of 
impaired predictive learning mechanisms. As such they serve a functional, even 
biologically adaptive, role. We appreciate this perspective, and we think that work 
on prediction errors represents a key avenue of research into delusions. 
Inferences about biological adaptiveness, however, may be unjustified here: As 
Millikan notes, the existence of doxastic shear pins “does not imply that failures 
to function properly are helpful, but only that in some circumstances it is best not 
to attempt to function at all.” 
 
Coltheart raises issues of truth and groundedness with respect to delusions, and 
asks us to clarify whether we consider well-grounded false beliefs to be misbeliefs. 
The short answer to this is Yes. Misbeliefs are simply false beliefs – they may be 
grounded or ungrounded. Grounded misbeliefs reflect forgivable design 
limitations: in contexts of imperfect information (we may be underinformed or 
even deliberately misinformed), misbeliefs are inevitable. Ungrounded 
misbeliefs, on the other hand, may result from culpable failures in naturally 
selected belief mechanisms (delusions), but they might also reflect designed 
features of such mechanisms (the adaptive misbeliefs we sought in the Target 
Article). Talmont-Kaminski claims that ungrounded beliefs fall outside our 
compass, but he seems to have misunderstood our expository strategy. 
Ungrounded beliefs are within our compass, but only insofar as such beliefs are 
false. This was perhaps overly stipulative, but it made our discussion manageable 
(for example, it allowed us to skirt moral beliefs and beliefs about norms more 
generally). As we stated in our Target Article, we do not expect adaptive 
misbeliefs to be generated by mechanisms designed to produce beliefs that are 
false per se. Rather, we implicate evolved tendencies for forming domain-specific 
ungrounded beliefs. Where these beliefs are (contingently) false, we will see 
adaptive misbelief. Where they are (contingently) true, they fall outside our 
purview. 
 
Not all ungrounded beliefs, of course, are adaptive: once again, we argue that 
such beliefs often reflect breakdowns in belief formation machinery, and where 
such beliefs are harmful (Wakefield’s value criterion), they constitute delusions. 
But here, too, ungrounded beliefs can be contingently true, as in the delusional 
jealousy example that Coltheart elaborates. We are quite happy for such cases of 
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“serendipitously” true belief (or “accidentally” true, as Coltheart prefers) to count 
as instances of delusion; they’re just not instances of misbelief. Where misbelief is 
concerned, truth is the critical feature, simply by (our) definition; where delusion 
is concerned, truth may ultimately be irrelevant (see Leeser & O’Donohue, 1999; 
Spitzer, 1990). In cases such as the delusional jealousy scenario that Coltheart 
outlines, truth or falsity may be difficult to establish – a feature that may 
contribute to the incorrigibility of such beliefs (many religious beliefs also have 
this feature; see discussion below). It is worth noting, however, that delusions can 
resist the presentation of manifestly contradictory evidence; indeed, as Mishara 
and Corlett show, such evidence may even strengthen delusional conviction 
through the process of reconsolidation (see Corlett, Krystal, Taylor & Fletcher, 
2009). 
 
Sperber makes the interesting point that most human beliefs are acquired via 
communication with others. Because of this, he doubts that most human beliefs 
are grounded in the sense of being “appropriately founded on evidence and 
existing beliefs”. We appreciate Sperber’s general point, but our view is that the 
testimony of others (whether oral or written) is ultimately just another source of 
evidence that should be weighed up when forming beliefs. We look up at the sky 
and form a belief about whether it will rain; later we listen to the weather forecast 
and revise our belief accordingly. The evidence of testimony may be easier to 
override than direct perceptual evidence (Langdon discusses the idea that 
delusions involve a loss of the ability to override the latter), but it is evidence that 
can ground belief nevertheless. We don’t see any reason to consider beliefs 
acquired via communication to be ungrounded. Sperber notes that “from a 
cognitive and social science point of view, a definition of ‘belief’ that excludes 
most religious beliefs renders itself irrelevant.” We agree with this, and we think 
the same of any definition of ‘grounded’ that excludes beliefs acquired by 
communication. Such a definition would guarantee its own irrelevance. 
 
R7. Error management theory and religion 
Haselton and Buss and Johnson pick up on our point about how adaptive 
behavioral biases need not reflect adaptive biases in belief. We do not doubt that 
when the costs of relevant errors in a given domain are recurrently asymmetric, 
selection should implement a bias toward committing less costly errors (Haselton 
& Nettle, 2006). Our point was that such biases need not involve a systematic 
departure from Bayesian belief revision, but merely judiciously biased action 
policies (see McKay & Efferson, under review, for a more thorough, technical 
treatment of these issues). A second point we made was that even when selection 
in accordance with the error management principle plausibly results in biased 
belief-forming processes, such processes may produce misbeliefs as tolerable by-
products rather than as adaptations (such biased systems may be adaptive not by 
virtue of the misbeliefs they produce, but by virtue of the fact that they minimize 
misbeliefs of a certain type). Millikan endorses this point. 
 
Haselton and Buss provide a valuable counterpoint to our skepticism 
regarding whether certain error management examples might qualify as examples 
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of adaptive misbelief. They observe that a demonstration that selection can solve 
such adaptive problems without misbelief is not a demonstration that selection 
has solved such problems without misbelief. Selection might have followed any 
number of design trajectories, subject to the physical, economic, historical and 
topographical constraints that we mentioned; it is an empirical question which 
trajectory was in fact followed. Haselton and Buss go on to suggest several 
reasons why biased beliefs might have featured in the solution to such adaptive 
problems. We are not convinced by their first suggestion, that such beliefs “could 
provide the motivational impetus for courtship behavior”. Judicious action 
policies, after all, would also provide that. Their next suggestion, that male 
misbeliefs about the sexual intent of women might help allay fears of rejection, is 
not obviously different from their first: presumably this is also a point about 
motivational impetus. It’s not clear why selection would go to the trouble of 
instilling fears of rejection and then installing biased beliefs to allay those fears, 
but again, it is an empirical matter which trajectory was in fact followed. Their 
final suggestion seems more promising to us: The confidence boost that biased 
beliefs provide might be attractive to females in and of itself. In a related analysis, 
Ackerman et al. imply that female misbeliefs about the commitment intentions 
of men might heighten the desires of potential suitors, leading to increased male 
investment and ultimately boosting the romantic returns to the females 
concerned. We have already discussed the similar points that Brown and Krebs 
and Denton make about how misbeliefs can transform the psychological states 
of others. 
 
Johnson takes an error management approach to supernatural belief, and 
argues that such belief is adaptive. His claim is that selection should favor belief 
in supernatural agents because such beliefs would yield exaggerated estimates of 
the risk of one’s social transgressions being detected. In our Target Article we 
indicated that we did not think there was strong evidence for this theory. Johnson 
has several points to make about the priming evidence we reviewed, but none of 
these points seem to help his case. First, he notes that the religious primes used 
by researchers tend to be culturally specific – typically derived from western 
Judeo-Christian traditions. The issue of cultural specificity is important, 
especially as regards genetic evolutionary claims (see our remarks above 
concerning the cross-cultural validity of positive illusions), but how should it 
apply here? We did not contest the findings that religious primes increase 
prosocial behavior – instead we queried whether such primes exert their effects 
by activating reputational concerns involving supernatural agents, and we also 
queried whether such effects are mediated by religious belief. Johnson then states 
that experiments may not “differentiate the behavior of ‘believers’ and ‘non-
believers’— Joe Bloggs may be an avowed atheist who, on his way to Las Vegas, is 
nevertheless very concerned about seeing a black cat or wearing his lucky jacket 
or what his grandmother would have said.” We’re not sure we follow this – we 
don’t see the relevance of such superstitious beliefs to the supernatural watcher 
hypothesis that Johnson advocates. We do, however, acknowledge Johnson’s 
point that many different belief systems might play the role of his “supernatural 
watcher” – karmic beliefs in comeuppance might inhibit social transgressions just 
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as effectively as beliefs in personal punitive deities. 
 
A further point that Johnson makes concerns the conclusions that can be drawn 
from priming studies. Evidence that supernatural primes promote prosocial 
behavior does not, he says, prove that supernatural beliefs are adaptive – such 
effects “could be evidence that religious primes turn people into suckers who give 
away precious resources.” We are confused by this point. The supernatural 
watcher hypothesis states that belief in supernatural agents inhibits antisocial 
behavior and is adaptive by virtue of that fact. Priming studies enable 
demonstrations of a causal link between religious priming and prosocial 
behavior. What kind of evidence would Johnson think relevant if not this? He 
doesn’t specify. Perhaps the problem is that Shariff and Norenzayan (2007) 
reported an increase in prosocial behavior (Dictator Game donations) following 
religious priming, whereas Johnson’s theory requires a decrease in antisocial 
behavior. If so, we draw attention to Randolph-Seng and Nielsen’s (2007) study, 
which found that participants primed with religious words cheated significantly 
less than controls on a subsequent task. The problem, from our perspective, is 
that this study could not empirically adjudicate between the supernatural watcher 
hypothesis and an alternative, behavioral priming, interpretation (Randolph-
Seng does not appear to dispute this point). The same limitation, we argued, 
applies to the studies of Pichon, Boccato and Saroglou (2007) and Shariff and 
Norenzayan (2007). 
 
Norenzayan, Shariff & Gervais pick up on this point, noting that 
supernatural watcher and behavioral priming mechanisms need not be mutually 
exclusive; they might well operate in tandem, and could even be mutually 
reinforcing. Nevertheless, these authors marshal evidence that provides support 
for the supernatural watcher account yet that resists a behavioral-priming 
interpretation. We appreciate their reference to the study of Dijksterhuis et al. 
(2008), although we worry that the baby is discarded with the bathwater here: 
this study disambiguates the felt presence of a supernatural agent from prosocial 
outcomes, certainly, but only by dispensing with a prosocial component 
altogether (this is not a gripe about the study itself, but about its interpretation 
vis-à-vis the supernatural watcher hypothesis). In general, however, we find the 
arguments of Norenzayan et al. to be quite persuasive. In particular, we are 
impressed by the results of the Gervais & Norenzayan (2009) study that they 
mention. The finding that religious primes activate public self-awareness is 
exactly the kind of result that is needed to substantiate the supernatural watcher 
hypothesis. We are keen to learn whether such reputational awareness moderates 
the magnitude of the primes’ effect on prosocial behavior. 
 
Norenzayan et al. attribute (mis)belief in supernatural agents to cultural rather 
than genetic evolution. Although, by their lights, religion does not therefore 
supply a case of evolved misbelief, we did not intend to restrict our analysis of 
adaptive misbelief to cases of genetic evolution. On the contrary, we are open, at 
least in principle, to the possibility that culturally selected religious beliefs 
constitute adaptive misbeliefs. Talmont-Kaminski, Wilson and Lynn and 
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Zawidzki provide related analyses. The accounts of Talmont-Kaminski and 
Wilson and Lynn are in fact almost identical – like Norenzayan et al. they view 
“religion as a cultural phenomenon that exapts existing cognitive by-products” 
(Talmont-Kaminski). Wilson and Lynn thus suggest that the tension between by-
product and adaptation explanations of religion can be defused: Both camps 
might be right – the by-product proponents where genetic evolution is concerned 
and the adaptation proponents where cultural evolution is concerned. 
 
Along with Johnson, Talmont-Kaminski remarks upon the lack of falsifiability 
of religious beliefs, and outlines several barriers, physical and social, to the 
exposure of religious belief as false. As Talmont-Kaminski notes, it is precisely 
because of such barriers to testability that supernatural beliefs are well suited to 
serving a functional role. Sperber provides an indispensable analysis of an 
additional class of barriers: barriers to comprehension. For a belief to be open to 
epistemic evaluation, he notes, it must have a propositional content, a truth 
value. Many religious beliefs, however, have only “semi-propositional” content – 
they are mysterious and obscure, permitting manifold exegeses. (Sperber’s 
concept of semi-propositional attitudes has not, alas, been influential among the 
philosophers who have devoted their careers to elucidating “classical” 
propositional attitudes. We can hope that a new generation of more empirically 
minded philosophers will eventually see the utility, indeed the inescapability, of 
acknowledging this set of at least belief-like phenomena.) According to Sperber, 
such beliefs are better suited to playing an adaptive role than many beliefs with 
ordinary propositional content: “content unproblematically open to epistemic 
evaluation might either raise objections within the relevant social group, or, on 
the contrary, be too easily shared beyond that group.” 
 
Bulbulia and Sosis propose yet another variety of beliefs (or belief-like states) 
whose function is not strictly to inform (or misinform) the believers about the 
layout of their world: cooperative commitments. Following Schelling, they 
suggest that a certain sort of commitment problem might be solved by something 
like a group myth that gets everybody on the same page, as one says. The 
commitment problem is this: getting individuals to cooperate can be like herding 
cats, but if the cats can be transformed into something more like sheep, by 
inculcating a religious myth in them all, this may create points of salience that 
engender the sorts of uniformity of attitude and synchrony of response that make 
large scale cooperative projects feasible. Once initiated, such a phenomenon 
might become more or less self-sustaining without any knowing supervision. 
Indeed, too much knowingness might subvert the whole enterprise, breaking the 
spell and tumbling everyone back into their feline individuality. It is important to 
note that if such a phenomenon did evolve (mainly by cultural evolution, one 
must suppose, with perhaps some genetic predisposition favoring it), individuals 
could be strongly motivated to resist any developments that threatened to 
undermine their obliviousness to the motivational source of their “conviction” or 
“faith” - without needing to know why they were so motivated. As usual, those 
who were blessed (by natural selection) with the disposition to behave in this way 
would be the beneficiaries of this clever arrangement without anybody needing to 
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understand the cleverness of it all - until Schelling came along. 
 
Wilson and Lynn give a vivid account of the ubiquity of deception in human 
culture, but seem to forget the adaptiveness of deceiving others. In the Target 
Article we set this topic aside as too obvious to need more than a brief review: Of 
course it is often  “adaptive” for kings to deceive their subjects, for generals to 
deceive their troops, for everyone to deceive their enemies. Who benefits - cui 
bono (Dennett, 1995, 2006) - from the false religious and social propaganda that 
they describe? Wilson and Lynn apparently assume that if it is not the individuals 
themselves whose fitness is enhanced by believing these falsehoods, it is the 
groups to which they belong - an instance of group selection utilizing cultural, not 
genetic, evolution. Again, we are open to this possibility – but we note that these 
authors overlook the other possibility proposed and defended by Dennett (1995, 
2006): it may be the memes’ own fitness that is enhanced by these adaptations, 
in which case these are instances of other-deception or host-manipulation, not 
group selection at all. One of the benefits of the memetic perspective is that it 
exposes the non sequitur in any argument that claims that some features are 
ubiquitous among groups and (hence) must be adaptive to those groups that have 
them. In order to establish religion as a case of (culturally selected) adaptive 
misbelief, one must show that individuals or groups that acquire religious 
cultural variants have an advantage over those not similarly “infected”. We think 
the jury is still out, and await evidence of this selective advantage. 
 
R8. Truth or consequences 
The ways in which the truth of beliefs can be divorced from their consequences 
for survival may be myriad, but do not extend as far as Schloss and Murray 
propose. As with other commentators, they think the case for adaptive (or fitness-
neutral) misbelief is stronger than we allow.  Our view, they claim, “requires the 
falsity of” the radical claims of Churchland, Plantinga, and Stich, and we agree; 
we think those views are clearly false, for reasons presented elsewhere (on 
Churchland and Plantinga, see Dennett, 2009, and forthcoming; on Stich, see 
Dennett, 1981, 1985). As Millikan notes, to say - as Stich does - that natural 
selection does not care about truth, is like saying that 
 
natural selection "does not care about" digesting food, pumping blood, supplying oxygen 
to the blood, walking, talking, attracting mates, and so forth.  For each of these activities 
can either be (biologically purposefully) set aside (the vomiting reflex, holding one's 
breath under water, sleeping) or simply fails to occur in many living things.  None the 
less, surely the main function for which the stomach was selected was the digestion of 
food, the lungs for supplying oxygen, and so forth, and a main function for which our 
cognitive systems were selected was the acquisition and use of knowledge, that is, true 
belief. 
 
Schloss and Murray also, we think, underestimate the force of Quine’s 
observations on systematic falsehood discussed by us, and their thought 
experiment about the robot competition can nicely expose the issue:  
 
While one would surely seek to program competing robots to form beliefs that provided 
an isomorphic ‘map’ of the external environment, would one further seek to program 
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beliefs about the environment that were true?  Not obviously.  Indeed, there are 
numerous ways of programming the robot to ‘conceptualize’ its environment that, while 
representationally biased or even radically false, are nonetheless (a) appropriately 
isomorphic and (b) reliably adaptive behavior-inducing.  Such programs would be 
adaptive. 
 
They are apparently imagining something like this: first the roboticist writes a 
program that captures all the relevant information in a behavioral “map” – and, 
to make the software development easier, all the nodes and action-
representations are given true labels (“cliff” means cliff and “wall” means wall 
and “go left” means go left, etc.), and then, once the system is up and running and 
well tested, the roboticist goes back and systematically replaces “cliff” with 
“street” and “go left” with “jump” and so forth, for all the terms in the program.  
Now, it seems, the robot believes that when it reaches the street it should jump, 
where before it believed that when it reached the cliff it should go left – but since 
the “isomorphism” is preserved, it actually turns left when approaching the cliff, 
just as before – it is like the Nearsighted Mr Magoo only more so! All its “false 
beliefs” conspire to keep it out of harm’s way. But, as Quine (among others) 
observed, what the nodes mean, what content they actually have, is not 
determined by their labels, but by their myriad connections with each other and 
the world.  The robot still has mainly true beliefs, but they are misleadingly 
“expressed” in the imagined internal labels. We think it is failure to appreciate 
this point that underlies much of the skepticism about the force of our default 
presumption.  The explanation of the behavioral success of any successful 
organism must be in terms of how its sense organs inform it about its behavioral 
environment. Misinformation can only “work” against a broad background of 
information. 
 
A final example: suppose people started saying, to everybody they encountered, 
“You’re the most wonderful person I’ve met!”  Perhaps initially this would have a 
benign effect, perking everyone up a little, but of course the effect would soon 
fade and the utterance would become the one-word synonym for “hello”: 
“urthemoswunnerfulpersonimet.”  Why?  Because utterances can only mean, in 
the long run, what their hearers take them to mean, and when utterers can no 
longer reasonably expect their hearers to take them to mean what their words 
“literally” mean, they can no longer have the intention of communicating by those 
words what the words used to mean, and then the words can no longer mean 
what they used to mean (“literally”). There is no way of divorcing what the subject 
believes, overall, from how the subject acts, so if an internal “danger to the left!” 
warning reliably leads the animal to jump left, not right, then the meaning of 
“left” and “right” in the animal’s representation system must have reversed - or it 
must have inverted its “policies” somehow. So for evolution to discover a move, a 
design, that reliably misleads an organism (in an adaptive direction) it must be 
that the organism for one reason or another cannot make the Quinean 
adjustment, or it is evolutionarily cheaper, more robust, for the organism to 
actually lie to itself than to make the policy adjustments that would do the 
adaptive thing given the truth about the situation. 
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R9. The “illusion of conscious will”? 
We had initially hoped to devote space in the Target Article to belief in free will as 
a candidate for adaptive misbelief, but the topic is huge and space limitations 
obliged us to postpone it altogether, so we are pleased that Mishara and 
Corlett and Randolph-Seng raise the issue. As in our treatment of the “user-
illusion” (see above, on Zawidzki), we think that there is a strong case to be 
made that this is best seen not as a useful falsehood, an enabling myth that we 
expose at our peril¸ but rather as simply an important true belief, once it is 
properly unpacked and laundered of obsolete connotations. 
 
Some (e.g. Blackmore, 1999; Crick, 1994; Wegner, 2002) have argued that science 
has shown that we don’t have free will. Others are compatibilists (e.g. Dennett, 
1984b, 2003a; Fischer, 1994; Fischer & Ravizza, 1998; Frankfurt, 1988; Mele, 
1995). Dennett, for instance, has argued that although there are varieties of free 
will that science has plausibly shown not to exist, there are others that are 
unscathed, and they are the varieties that matter. Belief in them is indeed crucial 
to our mental health (to put it crudely) but these are true beliefs, compatible with 
what science has discovered, and is likely to discover, about the mechanisms of 
human choice. Does what one believes about the reality of free will make a 
discernible difference? Vohs and Schooler (2008) show that students who read a 
passage (from Crick, 1994) assuring them that free will is a myth are more likely 
to cheat in a subsequent opportunity to win money. Like Dweck’s results, this 
finding might motivate a policy of deliberate myth-making, to try to preserve 
whatever shreds of responsibility remain in the wake of scientific self-knowledge, 
but since myth-maintenance is probably a losing battle even in the short run, for 
the reasons we have reviewed, a more stable policy might be to wean ourselves 
from the brittle traditional concepts, so that Crick’s message turns into a socially 
bland observation about the emptiness of an obsolete concept, not a subversive 
blow to the integrity of our self-image as responsible agents. The fact that this 
healthy perspective is a hard sell, perennially challenged by the all too obvious 
intuition that “real” free will requires something like a miracle, may be indirect 
evidence that we are not just “natural-born dualists” (Bloom, 2004) but natural-
born believers in incompatibilist versions of free will as well. Such (false) beliefs 
may indeed have been adaptive in the past, enabling our ancestors to face life’s 
decisions unburdened by misbegotten worries about causation and fatalism, but 
that does not make them necessary for mental health or effectiveness today. 
 
R10. Conclusion 
What is an adaptive misbelief? In essence, it’s a false belief that has a recurrently 
positive effect on the reproductive fitness of its consumers. (Of course, for better 
or worse we conflated adaptive with adapted or “evolved” in our Target Article; so 
false beliefs that were adaptive in the evolutionary past, but are not so nowadays, 
were of equal interest to us.) Let’s briefly recap each of these features. First, an 
adaptive misbelief must be a bona fide belief. It can’t be merely an alief, and it 
can’t be merely a pragmatic acceptance reflecting a judicious policy for action. 
Second, an adaptive misbelief must be false, at least in part (it must at least 
exaggerate the truth). It can’t have morphed into a mere metaphor that no longer 
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means what it would have to mean to be false (as in the case of free will, the self’s 
user illusion and the cases of “content erosion” we have discussed). 
 
Third, an adaptive misbelief must be adaptive (or have been adaptive, in the case 
of adapted misbelief – that pesky conflation again). Moreover, it must be adaptive 
for its consumers – lies that are adaptive for misinformants but harmful to the 
misinformed don’t count, nor do parasitic misbeliefs that evolve simply because 
they can evolve (see Dennett & McKay, 2006). Adaptive misbeliefs can’t just 
represent the tolerated outputs of adaptive systems, by-products that are carried 
along for the ride despite being useless or even harmless. And they can’t reflect 
the wholesale failures of internal mechanisms to carry out their naturally selected 
functions – at least not directly (we leave open here the possibility of naturally 
selected doxastic shear pins). Their effects must be recurrently positive – not 
lucky one-offs as in Stich’s (1990) case of “Harry”. Finally, their positive effects 
must be biologically beneficial, not just (or not necessarily) psychologically 
beneficial: they must enhance the reproductive fitness of their consumers. The 
mechanism of inheritance, however, can be genetic or cultural (natural selection 
can operate via either channel, as we remind Wilks). 
 
We identified positive illusions as the best candidates for adaptive misbelief. In 
doing so we did not seek to undermine the “default presumption” that true belief 
is adaptive. Although we remain open to the possibility of adaptive misbelief, our 
position is that misbelief will, for the most part, lead to costly missteps: misbelief 
can only be adaptive against a broad background of true belief. Some 
commentators (e.g., Dweck, Wilson & Lynn) suggest that we held religious 
beliefs to a stricter standard than positive illusions, and we accept that, pending 
further research, religious beliefs may represent an important cultural subspecies 
of evolved misbelief. But as Ainslie notes, we are the endlessly tinkering, self-
prospecting species, and such myths as we - or natural selection - may devise for 
ourselves are vulnerable to our insatiable curiosity. The tragic abyss that now 
opens before us is familiar from hundreds of tales, from Eve’s fatal apple and 
Pandora’s box, through Faust’s bargain, Bluebeard’s Castle and Dostoyevsky’s 
Grand Inquisitor: What price knowledge? Are we better off not knowing the 
truth? This question presupposes, implausibly, that we might have a choice, but it 
is probably too late in the day to opt for blissful ignorance. Science has seen to 
that, letting the cat out of the bag (to cite one more version of the tale). Now that 
skepticism is ubiquitous, “practically realistic” myths (Wilson & Lynn; see 
Wilson, 2002) are in danger of losing whatever effectiveness accounts for their 
preservation up to now. The frequency in the social world of recursive meta-
examinations (such as this article, along with thousands of others) has changed 
the selective pressures acting on such myths, making their extinction more likely, 
and not at all incidentally jeopardizing whatever benefits to us, their vectors, 
these myths may have provided. 
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